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The Legal Commitment of the United States to the
INTELSAT System
Bert W. Rein * and Carl R. Frank* *

I.

Introduction
In 1961 President John F. Kennedy offered U.S. leadership in

providing satellite communications to the entire world.' This initiative was incorporated in the Communications Satellite Act of 1962
(Satellite Act), in which Congress authorized the United States to
sponsor a global satellite consortium to provide nondiscriminatory

service to all nations. 2 This policy was solidified in a 1964 Interim
Agreement, 3 which was replaced in 1971 by a Final Agreement that
established the International Telecommunications Satellite Organi-

zation (INTELSAT). 4 Today, INTELSAT has 114 member nations,

5
and services still more.

$ Partner, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, Washington, D.C.; formerly, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State, Economic and Business Affairs, 1970-73; B.A. 1961, Amherst College;
LL.B. 1964, Harvard Law School.
** Associate, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, Washington, D.C.; B.S. 1980, curn laude, Syracuse University; J.D. 1983, cum laude, American University.
I The United States originally proposed the creation of a global satellite system "in
the interest of world peace and closer brotherhood among people throughout the world."
W. McDOUGALL, THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH 354 (1986) (quoting Policy Statement of

President John F. Kennedy (uly 24, 1961)).
2 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, § 102, 47 U.S.C. § 701 (1982).
The legislative debate that proceeded passage of this act was controversial but beyond
the scope of this Article. For an illustration of those controversies, see W. McDOUGALL,
supra note 1, at 356. For an excellent discussion of the legal background of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, see Glassie, Analysis of the Legal Authority for Establishment of
Private International Commnnications Satellite Systems, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 355,
361-68 (1984). See also Rosenblum, Regulation in Orbit: Adiinistrative Aspects of the Commiunications Satellite
Act of 1962, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 216, 216-19 (1963) (discussing the background of the Act in general). See generally Levin, Organization and Control of Comninications
Satellites, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 315 (1965) (comprehensively discussing the original version of

the Act); Note, The ConinicationsSatelliteAct of 1962, 76 HARV. L. REV. 388 (1962) (providing an excellent overview of the original version of the Act).
3 Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Commu-

nications Satellite System, opened for signature Aug. 20, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1705, T.I.A.S. No.
5646 [hereinafter Interim Agreement].
4 Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization "INTELSAT," opened for signature Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No. 7532
[hereinafter INTELSAT Agreement]. For a discussion of the international negotiations
that led to the creation of INTELSAT, see CoLINO, THE INTELSAT DEFINITIVE ARRANGEMENTS: USHERING IN A NEW ERA IN SATELLITE TELECOMMUNICATIONS

.5INTELSAT, 1987-88 INTELSAT REPORT ! (1988).

3-6 (1973).
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For twenty years following the negotiation of the interim arrangements for the INTELSAT system, the U.S. Government exercised comprehensive regulatory controls over U.S.. international
communications services. This ensured a prominent role for INTELSAT on U.S. international telecommunications routes and effectively guaranteed the success of INTELSAT's single global system.
These comprehensive regulatory controls included: (1) supervision
by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC or Commission)
and executive branch over the total circuit capacity on all U.S. international routes, regardless of whether such capacity was generated
by satellites, undersea cables, or landline facilities; 6 (2) allocation by
the FCC of transoceanic traffic between all available facilities under
"balanced loading" principles; 7 and (3) endorsement by the FCC of
tariff levels for the U.S. affiliate to INTELSAT, the Communication
Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), permitting recovery of the fully allocated costs of INTELSAT operations. 8
Recently, however, the United States changed its regulatory policy in an effort to allow market forces to shape the development and
use of facilities of U.S. international telecommunications routes.
Such a change in policy has caused the withdrawal of all applicable
U.S. Government controls, and the FCC and executive branch have
clearly indicated that they will not restrict private investors from laying any number of fiber-optic, undersea cables on major U.S.
routes. 9 Nor will the Government restrict private industry in the
launching of satellites on routes offering long-term leased international capacity not interconnected with the public switched system. In
Moreover, the United States has significantly loosened restrictions
on common carrier investment in fiber-optic transoceanic cables, I I
6 The FCC did so through several facilities planning dockets by determining estimates of circuit demand and supply in each ocean region for multiyear periods, but used a
more rigorous process for the North Atlantic region. See Rein, McDonald, Adams, Frank,
& Nielson, Implementation of a U.S. "Free Entr , ' Initiativefor Transatlantic Satellite Facilities:

Problems, Pitfalls, and Possibilities, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 459, 476-80 (1985)
(providing a general description of this process) [hereinafter Rein].
7 The concept of balanced loading pertains to an FCC requirement that U.S.-based
international carriers, principally American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T),
must activate one international satellite circuit for each cable circuit they wish to use. See
In re American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 13 F.C.C.2d 235, 237 (1968); In re Proposed

TAT-5 Project, II F.C.C.2d 957, 957-58 (1968) (advisory letter from the FCC to AT&T).
8 Communications Satellite Corp., 38 F.C.C. 1286, 1295-96 (1965), imodified in Com-

munications Satellite Corp., 27 F.C.C.2d 927, 930-31 (1971).
9 See Tel-Optik, Ltd., 100 F.C.C.2d 1033, 1040-42 (1985); Pacific Telecom Cable,

Inc., 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 2686, 2687-90 (1987).
Io See International Communications, 101 F.C.C.2d 1047 (1985).

For discussions of

this proceeding, see Rein, supra note 6, at 461-70; Godwin, The Proposed Orion and ISI Satellite Systems: A Challenge to the Status Quo, 24 JURIMETRICS J. 297, 325-28 (1984).
1 See American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 98 F.C.C.2d 440 (1984) (approving
North Atlantic cable with capacity far exceeding predicted demand); American Telephone
& Telegraph Co., Mimeo No. 1794 (Jan. 7, 1986) (approving Pacific cable with a capacity

far exceeding predicted demand); American Telephone & Telegraph Co. of Puerto Rico,
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and has taken a "hands-off" position on INTELSAT's own investments that provide additional capacity. 12 The FCC has also abolished its previous "balanced loading" requirement and withdrawn
from the mandatory allocation of traffic to INTELSAT or any other
facility. 33Finally, the FCC has stated that the pricing of INTELSAT
circuits by COMSAT are to be established by market forces gener14
ated by competing facilities.
The U.S. withdrawal of comprehensive controls over the development and use of international telecommunications facilities subjects INTELSAT and other facilities investors to the risks associated
with bad managerial decisions and adverse market conditions, which
could consequently lead to severe economic hardship or even enterprise failure. Such risks are necessary by-products of competitive
markets and concomitant to profit opportunities in the unregulated
communications markets of the future. Exposing INTELSAT's
global system to these risks, however, raises difficult issues of policy
and law.
Much attention has focused on the wisdom of a policy that
would permit the INTELSAT system to be curtailed or withered by
competition at the inevitable cost of adversely affecting U.S. relations
with smaller INTELSAT members or major powers who are equally
dependent on INTELSAT. 15 This Article deals with several related,
but distinguishable, questions including: (1) whether the U.S. Government has a legal obligation to safeguard INTELSAT from these
risks under its own domestic law or under the international obligations it accepted in the INTELSAT Agreement; (2) if so, what degree
of security the U.S. Government is obligated to provide to INTELSAT; and (3) what mechanisms are available for the enforcement of
such legal obligations.
II.

United States Safeguard Obligations
A.

Domestic Law Safeguards

The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 established domestic
rules for the licensing of satellites to provide service on U.S. international routes. Under the Satellite Act of 1962, Congress committed
Inc., 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 5917 (1988) (approving Caribbean cable with capacity far exceeding
predicted demand).
12 Cf. Communications Satellite Corp., F.C.C. 86-173 (Apr. 17, 1986).
13 International Carrier Circuits, 3 F.C.C. Red. 2156 (1988).
14 Id. at 2158-60. See also Communications Satellite Corp., 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 2420
(1987).
15 See In re Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, 101 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1064-87; SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION POLICY,

A

WHITE PAPER ON NEW INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE

SYSTEMS 17 (1985) [hereinafter WIIITE PAPER]; Rein, supra note 6, at 501-1l; Potamitis,
Competition in InternationalSatellite Telecominmications Services, 44 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV.

34, 44-54 (1986).
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the United States "to establish, in conjunction with other countries,
... a commercial communications satellite system, as part of an improved global communications network .... ,16 To that end, Congress provided for a unique U.S. corporate participant in the
proposed international venture, the Communications Satellite Corporation. Congress also established ownership, control, and regulatory parameters to ensure that COMSAT acted in the national
interest and did not disrupt competition between pre-existing U.S.
entities that provided international communications services directly
to users.' 7 Section 102(d) of the Satellite Act made clear that the
FCC was precluded from licensing any other international satellite
system to provide service on U.S. routes absent a prior determination that such systems were "required to meet unique governmental
needs, or ... otherwise required in the national interest."'18 Thus, regulation of an exclusive satellite service provider, rather than competition, was the anticipated U.S. method of ensuring that the full
benefits of satellite technology were passed on to communications
users. Such regulation would be accomplished through government
supervision of COMSAT's role in the international system and FCC
regulation of COMSAT's service offerings to other U.S. carriers.
The exclusive status accorded to the proposed international system under the 1962 Act was a cornerstone of the U.S. position in the
negotiations leading up to the INTELSAT Interim Agreement in
1964 and the definitive INTELSAT Agreements in 1971.19 The
United States insisted on, and essentially achieved, an undertaking
from all members of the interim INTELSAT organization that no
competing satellite systems would be authorized.2 0 Though the
United States was less successful in foreclosing the potential for
competing systems under the actual INTELSAT Agreements, it did
secure commitments that such systems would not be allowed to
cause technical harm or "significant economic harm" to the INTELSAT organization.21
The U.S. authority to negotiate the interim and definitive Agreements arose directly from the 1962 Satellite Act. The contemporaneous understanding of that Act was that so long as INTELSAT was
accorded sufficient scope and resources to meet U.S. international
satellite communications needs, the United States was prepared to
16 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, § 102(a), 47 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982).
17 See Glassie, supra note 2, at 361-68 (describing history of legislation and fundamental disagreements over the proposed organization of COMSAT).
18 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, § 102(d), 47 U.S.C. § 701(d) (1982).

11)The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 authorized the executive branch to call
a plenipotentiary conference with other nations interested in forming a satellite cooperative. See id. § 201(a), 47 U.S.C. § 721(a) (1982).
'2) See COLINO, supra note 4, at 6.
21 INTIELSAT Agreement, supra note 4, art. XIV, 23 U.S.T. at 3854. See alo COLINO,
supra note 4, at 91-92.
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forego the "national interest" licensing authority in the 1962 Act
whereby the FCC could approve alternate international systems.
Although not requiring that INTELSAT be safeguarded from all
commercial satellite competition on U.S. routes, the Satellite Act was
interpreted to permit the United States to foreclose such competition
entirely by international agreement or to agree to substantive limitations on such competition in order to ensure the welfare of
INTELSAT.
Such foreclosures or limitations on competition in the definitive
INTELSAT Agreements are clearly consistent with the 1962 Satellite
Act. They are incorporated in U.S. law by the INTELSAT Agreements, which are given treaty-equivalent status as executive agreements undertaken pursuant to an express prior congressional
mandate. 22 As a result, INTELSAT is safeguarded from the introduction of commercial satellite competition under U.S. domestic law
both by the the Satellite Act's requirement that the competition be in
the "national interest," and by those additional entry limitations accepted by the United States in the INTELSAT Agreement.
1. The "National Interest" Limit On Injurious Competitive
Entry
a.

Transborder Satellites

Initial domestic law consideration of "national interest" limitations on the entry of competing international satellites came about
somewhat indirectly through U.S. authorization of domestic satellite
systems whose footprints extended to Canada, Mexico, and nearby
Caribbean countries. 23 Operators of these satellites sought to provide international services between those points and the United
States on a peripheral and incidental basis. 24 The FCC accepted the
argument that the primarily domestic orientation of these systems
eliminated the need for a formal "national interest" determination
under the 1962 Act as a precondition of so-called "transborder" in22 Although not formally a treaty, because congressional approval preceded formation of the agreement, the INTELSAT agreement is a Congressional-Executive agreement,
which normally is considered to have the full force of a treaty. See RESTATEMENT (THmIRD) OF

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 303 comment e (1986) ("[The] pre-

vailing view is that the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to

the treaty method in every instance.") [hereinafter

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)];

B. Altman &

Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 598-602 (1912) (stating that a Congressional-Executive
agreement is a "treaty" under statute conferring appellate jurisdiction).
23 See Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities, 22 F.C.C.2d 86 (1970), 35
F.C.C.2d 844 (1972), recon. 38 F.C.C.2d 665 (1972). Hughes Aircraft Co., 43 F.C.C.2d
1141 (1973); Western Union Telegraph Co., 38 F.C.C.2d 1197 (1973) (authority to construct domestic satellites).
24 Such services would permit an existing network user to communicate with offices
in nearby Canada and Mexico without arranging for alternative communications facilities.

N.CJ.
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ternational service. 2 5 Nevertheless, the FCC sought executive
branch guidance to determine whether such services could be authorized consistent with the 1962 Act and the INTELSAT
26
Agreements.
The executive branch furnished its views in aJuly 23, 1981 letter
from Undersecretary of State James L. Buckley to FCC Chairman
Mark Fowler (Buckley Letter). 27 The Buckley Letter noted that international services via satellite systems other than INTELSAT on
U.S. routes was not precluded by the 1962 Act or by the definitive
INTELSAT Agreements. Nevertheless, the Buckley Letter stated
that "[t]he integrity of the INTELSAT system is important to achieving the goals established in the Communications Satellite Act of
1962."28 The letter concluded that alternative capacity could be authorized to serve internationally only where INTELSAT (1) "could
not provide the service required," or (2) where the "service planned
would be clearly uneconomical or impractical using the INTELSAT
29
system."
These limitations, though overtly regulatory in nature, 30 had no
express relation to the "significant economic harm" limitation of the
INTELSAT Agreement. 3 1 The Buckley Letter focused on the procedural coordination obligations imposed on the United States under
the INTELSAT Agreements and on establishing a "national interest" test which the FCC could apply without regard to whether it
paralleled the "significant economic harm" standard in the INTEL32
SAT Agreement.
The Buckley Letter clearly viewed the "national interest" requirement of the 1962 Satellite Act as limiting entry to alternative
systems that supplemented rather than competed with INTELSAT services. Under either prong of the Buckley test, an alternative service
25 Indeed, no entity argued that a determination was required under § 102(d) of the
Communications Satellite Act of 1962.
26 See Transborder Satellite Video Services, 88 F.C.C.2d 258, 271 (1981) ("[Wle have
hesitated to act up to now ... until we received official guidance from the Department of
State in its capacity as foreign policy advisor and spokesman for the Executive Branch.").
27 Letter from James L. Buckley, Undersecretary of State, to Mark S. Fowler, FCC
Chairman (July 23, 1981) (containing an interagency task force's conclusions with respect
to whether the "transborder policy" was compatible with the United States' obligations

under INTELSAT), reprinted in Transborder Satellite Video Services, 88 F.C.C.2d at 28789 [hereinafter Buckley Letter].
28 Id. at 287.
29 Id. at 288.

30 In other words, providing service to adjacent international points using Domsats
(domestic satellites) required special Department of State consideration and FCC authorization, and could not be merely undertaken in accordance with the dictates of the
marketplace.
31 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 4, art. XIV(d), 23 U.S.T. at 3854.
32 The FCC might have taken the position that Domsat traffic which is uneconomic or
impractical on INTELSAT would not harm the global system. However, in the eight years

that the FCC has been applying its policy it has never taken such a position.

INTELSAT
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would be foreclosed unless its proponents showed that but for the proposed alternative service, no satellite communications of the contemplated type

wouldflow. 3 3 The Buckley test effectively foreclosed the diversion of
INTELSAT's existing or potential traffic to a commercial satellite alternative and eliminated price competition between INTELSAT and
such a system since it entitled INTELSAT to the traffic flow unless
INTELSAT carriage was "uneconomical or impractical."
In 1988 the Buckley test was reviewed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in an appeal of a later grant of a
transborder license to a domestic satellite corporation, Teleport International..3 4 In the Teleport case, the court found a "protectionist
policy in favor of INTELSAT embodied in applicable law and treaties" including a "purpose ... to shield INTELSAT from price com-

petition."'13 5 It recognized the Buckley Letter as an "attempt to give
content to the statutory [national interest] provision" and endorsed
FCC reliance on the principles of section 102(d) of the 1962 Satellite
Act in evaluating international service proposals by domestic satellite
3
operators. "
As a result, the court set aside an FCC authorization of transborder U.S.-Jamaica service that was based on the finding that INTELSAT service was "uneconomical" solely because INTELSAT was
more expensive than the domestic alternative. 3 7 The court stated
that it was "hard pressed to understand how such an outcome is
compatible with the Buckley Letter, not to mention the Communications Satellite Act and the Intelsat Treaty."' 38 It held that an "uneco-

nomic" finding must be based on a qualitative (system configuration)
difference between INTELSAT service and the domestic alternative,
rather than a mere quantitative price difference..3 1' Thus, the court
concurred with the Buckley Letter that the "national interest" requirement under the 1962 Act did not include a national interest in
price competition.
b.

Separate Satellites

The Buckley Letter approach is generally deferential to INTELSAT and appears to be based on the policy goals of global cooperation expressed and implied in the 1962 Satellite Act. This approach
was not used, however, when the executive branch re-evaluated and
33 The Buckley Letter required that Domsat applicants carry the burden of proof. See
Buckley Letter, supra note 27, at 288.
'34 Communications Satellite Corp. v. FCC, 836 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Teleport].
35 Id. at 625, 632.
36 Id. at 626, 630.
37 See In re Teleport International Ltd. and American Satellite Co., I F.C.C. Rcd. 101,
103 (1986).
38 Teleport, 836 F.2d at 633.
39 See id. at 633.
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substantially modified its policy towards competing satellite systems
in 1984.
The shift came with the applications of several entities to construct new satellites poised over ocean regions and designed to carry
40
traffic between the United States and points in Europe or Asia.
These entities did not propose incidental international services;
rather, their systems were to be designed and constructed solely to
compete with INTELSAT for transoceanic traffic. 4 1 These, then,
were entirely "separate" systems rather than merely domestic satellites broadcasting internationally.
The FCC stayed its hand on the separate systems applications
pending executive branch evaluation of their foreign policy implications. In late 1984, acting under Presidential Determination No. 852, the Reagan Administration found separate satellite systems to be
in the national interest so long as their capacity was offered on a
capacity sale or long-term basis and was not interconnected with the
public switched network. 4 2 The Administration's separate systems
position emphasized the advantages of competition in stimulating
the use of satellite facilities in private communications systems, developing innovative satellite offerings, and reducing consumer
43

costs.

In support of the Determination, an Executive Branch Task
Force released a "White Paper" in 1985 on the separate satellites
policy. 4 4 While the White Paper was somewhat critical of INTEL-

SAT's service offerings to potential private system customers, it did
not attempt to show that separate systems were a required supplement
to the INTELSAT system or that the traffic they would carry would
otherwise not be carried by INTELSAT. On the contrary, the White
in
Paper focused almost exclusively on the benefits that competition
45
international satellite services would bring U.S. users.
Because of the difference between such separate systems and the
previous transborder policy, the executive branch was required to
face squarely the "significant economic harm" limitation contained
in the INTELSAT Agreement. 46 The United States did so through
4o For an overview of the applications, see generally Colino, A Chronicle of Policy and
Prvcedure: The Formulation of the Reagan Adninistration Policy on InternationalSatellite Telecommunications, 13J. SPACE L. 103 (1985).
41 E.g., Application of Orion Satellite Corp., FCC File No. CSS-83-002-P (LA) (filed
Mar. 11, 1983); Application of Pan American Satellite Corp., FCC File No. CSS-84-004-P
(LA) at 2, 16 (filed June 4, 1984).
42 Presidential Determination No. 85-2, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,987 (Nov. 30, 1984).
43 See Letter from George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, and Malcolm Baldridge, Secretary of Commerce, to Mark S. Fowler, FCC Chairman (Nov. 28, 1984), replintedin Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, 100 F.C.C.2d 290,
315-16 (1988).
44 See supra note 15 (citing WHITE PAPER).
45 WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 11-14.
46 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 4, art. XIV(d), 23 U.S.T. at 3854.
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service limitations imposed on separate systems, limiting them to
47
nonswitched traffic not interconnected with the public network.
The White Paper concluded that the restrictions would shield ninety
percent of INTELSAT's revenue from direct competition and there48
fore create only a limited challenge to the INTELSAT system.
Although the analytical "national interest" focus of the Satellite Act
was centered on a need to justify additional capacity, the White Paper
simply assumed such capacity was a necessary element of fostering
competition, and moved to a more general inquiry of whether the
type of competition and traffic diversion being authorized would unduly impair the INTELSAT system.
The FCC enthusiastically endorsed the new executive branch
criteria in its 1985 Separate Systems decision. 4 9 It concluded independently that the competition provided by separate systems was in
the national interest 50 and that the executive branch limitations were
sufficient to ensure the viability of INTELSAT. 5 1 The FCC made
clear that its threshold for concern over "significant economic harm"
to the INTELSAT system was relatively high and would not be
reached absent a showing that "INTELSAT's very existence" at a
52
minimal service level was at least at reasonable risk.
Unlike the transborder policy, the separate satellite decisions of
the executive branch and the FCC have not been reviewed by the
courts to determine their consistency with the Satellite Act and the
INTELSAT Agreement. Nevertheless, the analysis in the Teleport decision strongly suggests that a "national interest" authorization premised only on the virtues of competition could not withstand a
judicial challenge under the Satellite Act. Indeed, because the "competition" promised by separate satellites is based on price competition with INTELSAT, the Teleport evaluation would53 also call into
question the underlying Presidential Determination.
A new element was added to the legal framework for competition with INTELSAT with the 1985 passage of section 146 of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1986. 54 Section 146 reiterates the policy support for INTELSAT found in the 1962 Satellite
47 WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 31 ("Limiting new entrants to customized services
reduces any likelihood of significant adverse economic impact on INTELSAT.").
48 Id. at 34.
49 In re Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications,
101 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1985).
50 Id. at 1177-79.
51 See id. at 1115-47.
52 Id. at 1129.

53 The Presidential Determination purported to operate within the Communications
Satellite Act of 1962. See Presidential Determination No. 85-2, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,987 (Nov.
30, 1984) (stating that action is under authority given to the President by § 102(d) and
§ 201(a) of the Communication Satellite Act of 1962). If so, it would be required to be
consistent with the approach taken in that statute, including its protection of INTELSAT.
54 Pub. L. No. 99-93, § 146, 99 Stat. 405, 425 (1985). See also infra note 58 and accom-
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Act, but also expresses congressional support for competitive separate satellite systems in compliance with the "executive branch conditions established pursuant to the Presidential Determination No.
85-2." 55 Thus, it may be argued that the intent and effect of section
146 was to supplant the "national interest" finding requirement of
the 1962 Act through an absolute bar on separate systems outside
Determination 85-2 conditions, and a wholly permissive licensing regime for satellites operating within those limitations.
Although the above construction of section 146 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act is tenable, it is not necessarily persuasive for three reasons. First, section 146 itself states that the United
States should avoid licensing actions that cause technical or economic harm to the INTELSAT system and reaffirms the U.S. commitment to INTELSAT. 5 6 As Congress clearly showed no intent to
override international commitments to INTELSAT, section 146 is
properly read as dealing only with domestic law-originated limitations on separate system authorizations while leaving undisturbed
limitations arising from U.S. international obligations.
Second, section 146 does not expressly delete or amend section
102(d) of the 1962 Satellite Act and thus leaves in place the general
'5 7
rule that separate satellites be "required in the national interest."
While section 146 evidences general congressional support for competition in noninterconnected services, there may be some circumstances where separate satellite authorizations are not "required" to
provide such competition. For example, where substantial private
cable capacity is present on particular routes, competition with INTELSAT may be sufficiently intense and therefore not require additional satellite capacity. Indeed, section 146 might be read simply to
require Presidential Determination 85-2 limitations in situations
where the pre-existing "national interest" test of section 102(d) of
the Satellite Act is otherwise satisfied.
Third, there is some question as to whether section 146 is incorporated into organic law or has expired with the 1986-87 appropriation to which it was attached. The compiler of the U.S. Code has not
codified section 146 into the Communications Satellite Act but
merely lists it as a note to section 102 of the Satellite Act. 58 Nevertheless, section 146 was drafted as organic legislation with no visible
tie to 1986-87 events, 5 '9 and was treated as an Act with continuing
panying text noting that § 146 has not been officially codified as a statute per se in the
United States Code.
55 Id. § 146(b)(1), 99 Stat. at 425. See also infa note 58 and accompanying text.

56 Id. § 146(a)(2)(B). See also infa note 58 and accompanying text.
57 47 U.S.C. § 701(d) (1982).
58 See 47 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. IlI 1985).
51) Other provisions contained in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal

Years 1986 and 1987 were codified into positive law. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 4314 (Supp. Ill
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validity by the D.C. Circuit in the Teleport decision. 60 Thus, it seems
probable that section 146 must be read together with section 102(d)
of the Satellite Act in assessing separate satellite entry limitations
under U.S. domestic law.
In sum, the legal safeguards against competitive injury to INTELSAT from new satellite entry under U.S. domestic law seem to
include both the section 102(d) and section 146 licensing restrictions
as well as applicable international commitments under the INTELSAT Agreements. The proper interpretation of the licensing limitations is somewhat murky and depends on the extent to which section
146 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act modifies the "national interest" limitations enunciated in Teleport. The proper interpretation of the INTELSAT Agreement's limitations is discussed
later in this Article.
2.

Other Domestic Law Safeguards Against Undue Diversion of
INTELSA T Traffic Potential

Consideration of domestic law safeguards against undue diversion of INTELSAT's traffic potential to undersea cable has long been
an element of the U.S. legal regime. This is because undersea cable
facilities predated the INTELSAT system 6 ' and have remained a viable technical alternative for virtually all INTELSAT services. 62 As in
the case of separate satellite facilities, undue diversion has been considered in FCC licensing decisions on cable investment proposals. 6 3
Moreover, even after decisions have been made to authorize cable
construction, U.S. regulators have allocated traffic between cable and
satellite systems in order to enhance the INTELSAT system. 64
The allocation of international traffic between competing systems is anathema to the deregulatory philosophy of the current
FCC, 6 5 and the Commission has now totally withdrawn from that ac1985) (codifying § 126 of the Act, which authorizes protective services for foreign
missions).
(( The Teleport case was decided after expiration of the periods covered by the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act of 1986. Both the majority and the concurring opinions cited
and discussed the provision as if it were controlling law. See Teleport, supra note 34, at 627
("Congress undertook to write [the separate systems policy] into law as part of the 198687 Foreign Relations Authorization Act.").
(i

See Rein, snpra note 6, at 476.

12Undersea cables between the United States, Europe, Asia, and the Caribbean interconnect with the public network at those overseas points and can connect with virtually
any accessible location. The technical advantages of satellites are limited principally to
remote locations and "point-to-multipoint" services.
63 See generallv In re Policy to be Followed in Future Licensing of Facilities for Overseas Communications, 67 F.C.C.2d 358 (1977) (rejecting the initial TAT-7 proposal).
64 See American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 13 F.C.C.2d 235, 250 (1968).
65 Since the early 1970s, the Commission has implemented deregulatory philosophies
designed to maximize competition and reliance on the marketplace. See generally In re Allocations of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., 29 F.C.C. 825 (1960) (permitting private microwave systems); In re Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration
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tivity.6 6 Nevertheless, U.S. practice has established that the FCC has
the power to allocate traffic in order to safeguard the INTELSAT
system against undue traffic diversion from any source. Thus,
should the international obligations of the United States require it to
take action to increase INTELSAT carriage on U.S. routes, U.S. domestic law provides a proven and effective vehicle to meet those
obligations.
B.

InternationalLaw Safeguards

Article XIV(a) of the INTELSAT Agreement specifically obligates all government parties to "exercise their rights and meet their
obligations under this Agreement in a manner fully consistent with
and in furtherance of the principles stated in the Preamble and other
provisions of this Agreement." 6 7 This broad statement reflects the
customary international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, which is
codified in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties 68 and acknowledged in section 321 of the latest Restatement of
U.S. Foreign Relations law. 69 The essence of pacta sunt servanda is
that a state may not act inconsistently with the object and purpose of
a treaty to which it is party.
As set forth in its Preamble and recognized by the D.C. Circuit
in Teleport, the core objective of the INTELSAT Agreement is the
successful establishment and operation of "a single global commercial telecommunications satellite system" that "will provide expanded telecommunications services to all areas of the world" and
will make those services available "consistent with the best and most
equitable use of the radio frequency spectrum and of orbital
space." 70 The Agreement requires that the foregoing be accomof Application to Provide Specialized Common Carriers in the Domestic Public Point-toPoint Microwave Radio Service and Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43, and 61 of the
Commission's Rules, 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971) (authorizing specialized common carriers),
aff'd sub noin. Washington Util. & Transportation Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975); I1 re Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared
Use of Common Carrier Services and Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976), recon. 62 F.C.C.2d
588 (1977) (permitting resale of private lines), aff'd sub nora. American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978); In re Regulatory

Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Domestic Public Switched
Network Services, 83 F.C.C.2d 167 (1980) (permitting resale of long-distance services),

recon. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978); In re Regulation of Domestic Receive-only Satellite Earth
Stations, 74 F.C.C.2d 205 (1980) (permitting competition in long-distance services).
66 In re Policy for the Distribution of United States International Carrier Circuits
Among Available Facilities During the Post-1988 Period, 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 2156, 2160 (1988).
67 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 4, art. XIV(a), 23 U.S.T. at 3853.
68 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, opened for signature May 23,

1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention
has not been ratified by the United States but is nonetheless accepted as a codification of
the customary law of treaty interpretation. See RESTATEMENT (TIRD), supra note 22,
§§ 313, 314 comment b.
69 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 321 comment a.
70 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 4, preamble, 23 U.S.T. at 3814.
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plished under rates for all parties which "shall be the same . . .for

that type of utilization. ' 7' Thus, the objects and purposes of INTELSAT include global coverage, economically sustainable operations, nondiscriminatory rates, rate levels which will allow expanded
service to all areas of the world, and maximum utilization ("fill") of
INTELSAT satellites to extract maximum benefit from the frequencies and orbital positions INTELSAT occupies.
By entering into the INTELSAT Agreement, the United States
and other parties agreed to refrain from actions that would defeat
these objectives. This obligation applies whether actions are direct
limitations on INTELSAT operations (such as prohibitions or limita72
tions on soliciting business from national carriers or local users),
or limitations on INTELSAT's ability to secure the resources it needs
for successful operations (such as discriminatory restrictions on the
availability of launch services). 73 The obligation also applies to such
actions as the authorization of competing circuit capacity, which affects INTELSAT's economic viability and its efficient use of frequency and orbital space, and the introduction of rate competition,
which affects INTELSAT's ability to maintain a traffic-expanding
nondiscriminatory rate structure. Thus, as the United States has traditionally recognized through its integrated regulation of the construction of transoceanic cable and satellite capacity and its "balance
loading" supervision of all transoceanic circuit use, compliance with
pacta sunt servanda and Article XIV(a) must be assessed against the

full range of national actions that significantly affect INTELSAT's
operations.
At the time the INTELSAT Agreements were negotiated, it was
assumed that governments would strike a balance between the construction of cable and satellite capacity and that all governments, including the United States, would affirmatively allocate traffic among
facilities. 74 The protective thrust of specific international agreement
was therefore largely directed at the possible diversion of satellite
traffic to alternative satellite systems. The foreclosure of alternative
systems under the Interim Agreement resolved that concern until
contested and differ1971, but the alternative system issue was hotly
75
ently resolved in the definitive Agreements.
71 Id., art. V(d), 23 U.S.T. at 3823.

72 The signatories of INTELSAT, and not INTELSAT itself, actually offer satellite
services in each nation. See id., art. 111(a), 23 U.S.C. at 3819.
73 In fact, for years the United States exclusively latnched INTELSAT satellites because it was the only INTELSAT member who possessed the capability. Especially after
the Challenger disaster, however, INTELSAT has increasingly relied upon Ariane, the European space consortium, for satellite launches.
74 When the INTELSAT agreements were negotiated, the United States' reliance on
competition had not yet begun. As a result, international facilities were little more than
shared bridges between monopolists on either side of the circuit.
75 See COLINO, supra note 4, at 6.
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Largely at the insistence of European governments who demanded the right to create a European-controlled regional satellite
system to replace landline connections in Europe, the INTELSAT
parties agreed not to foreclose commercial satellite alternatives to
the global system. 76 Nevertheless, recognizing the sensitivity of decisions to launch and use such systems under Article XIV(a) and pacta
sunt servanda, a special procedure was created to assist a party proposing to use a separate system in evaluating its Agreement obligations. This procedure, contained in Article XIV(d), specifies that a
proposing party shall "ensure technical compatibility of [proposed]
facilities and their operation with the use of the radio frequency
spectrum and orbital space by the... INTELSAT space segment and
...

avoid significant economic harm to the global system of INTEL-

SAT." '7 7 To that end, the proposing party is required to furnish all
relevant information to the INTELSAT Assembly of Parties and to
receive advice from the Assembly in the form of findings concerning
78
technological and economic harm issues.
Article XIV(d) findings are not binding on the proposing party
but are required to be given good faith consideration before the
party makes its final decision under Article XIV(a). 79 The significant
weight that the United States believes should be accorded the collective view of INTELSAT parties expressed under Article XIV(d) is explicitly affirmed by section 146 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, which establishes special congressional review
procedures in the event a U.S. proposal is the subject of an adverse
Article XIV(d) finding." ° Although INTELSAT has never disapproved a requested Article XIV(d) coordination, 8 1 the United States
nevertheless appears to be moving toward an era where its marketplace philosophy is at odds with the goals of the organization.
It is doubtful that any departure from the concept of a global
cooperative in favor of a freely competitive system is warranted by
the principle of "changed circumstances," also known as rebus sic
stantibus. This principle, which also is codified in the Vienna Conven76 See id. at 91-92.
77 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 4, art. XIV(d), 23 U.S.T. at 3854.

78 Id. ("[S]uch Party ...shall furnish all relevant information to and shall consult with
the Assembly of Parties.").
79 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 18 ("Such recommendations are not binding on

the United States, although the U.S. will carefully consider all recommendations."); Note,
Bypassing INTELSAT Fair Conmpetition or 'iolation
of theINTELSAT Agreetment, 8 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 479, 509 (1985).

8o See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No.
99-93, § 146(d), 99 Stat. 405, 426 (1985); seealso supra note 58 and accompanying text
(noting that section 146 has not been officially codified as a statute per se in the U.S.
Code).
81 Indeed, INTELSAT approved the Teleport International coordination that was

later struck by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See INTELSAT Assembly of Parties Record of Decision, AP-I 1-4E (April 1-2, 1987).
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tion and acknowledged in the Restatement of Foreign Relations law,
permits termination of treaty obligations when the facts and conditions upon which they were founded have substantially and fundamentally changed. 8 2 The United States rarely invokes this principle,
chiefly because of fears that its allies would claim the benefit of the
8 3 It
doctrine with regard to obligations flowing to the United States.
is also far from clear that a trend toward a marketplace approach to
telecommunications facilities could be considered fundamental
enough to warrant
alteration of the legal commitments of INTEL84
SAT parties.
Even if the doctrine of changed circumstances applied, it would
not justify a renunciation of specific INTELSAT obligations. Rebus
sic stantibus merely permits a party to withdraw or denounce a treaty
as a whole; it is not a principle of interpretation permitting a lesser
commitment under a continuing treaty.8 5 Because the INTELSAT
agreement itself contains a withdrawal provision in Article XVI, 8s the

changed circumstances doctrine adds little to the parties' pre-existing rights to exit the INTELSAT organization.
In sum, the INTELSAT Agreement, considered as a whole and
in the context of customary international law and the Vienna Convention, provides significant technical and economic safeguards
against harm to INTELSAT. These safeguards are also recognized
in U.S. domestic law through the treaty-equivalent status of the INTELSAT Agreements.8 7 The fact that the INTELSAT parties provided a special advisory procedure for evaluating those safeguards
only in the case of alternative satellite facilities is easily understandable in light of the historical context of negotiation and the specialized satellite expertise of the INTELSAT organization. Neither the
limited scope of that procedure, nor its advisory character, however,
can be deemed to override or narrow Article XVI(a) orpacta sunt servanda, or to make procedural compliance with Article XVI(d) alone a
substitute for adherence to INTELSAT's purposes and objectives.
III. Required Safeguard Levels
Assuming that the United States now has the domestic legal
power under section 146 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
82 Vienna Convention, supra note 88, art. 62(l), 1155 U.N.T.S. 352; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 22, § 336.
83 See Haraszti, Treaties and Fundamental Change of Circunstances, 146 RECUEIL
CODRS, I, 22 (1975).

DES

84 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), snpa note 22, § 336 (listing requirement to invoke the
doctrine); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), 1973 I.CJ. Rep. 3, 2021 (circumstances of fishing technology insufficiently altered to permit termination of
clause granting International Court of Justice jurisdiction over fishing rights dispute).
85 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), snpra note 22, § 336.
8" INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 4, art. XVI, 23 U.S.T. at 3857.
87 See -leleport, supra note 34. at 624.
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to authorize competing satellite systems and undersea cable capacity
on INTELSAT routes so long as that capacity does not impair the
objects and purposes of INTELSAT, two additional issues arise in
determining how U.S. domestic and international law obligations
limit competitive flexibility. The first issue concerns how extensive
an INTELSAT system is required to achieve INTELSAT's purposes
and is therefore entitled to be safeguarded. The second concerns
what degree of capacity or price competition between INTELSAT
and other facilities should be deemed to cause significant economic
harm to INTELSAT and therefore require U.S. Government
intervention.
The INTELSAT system has grown substantially since its inception and now makes capacity available for a multitude of international services and domestic uses not inconsistent with the
international prime mission. s8 This raises the question of the identity and scope of the INTELSAT system that is the beneficiary of the
Article XIV(d) protection. It is possible and not altogether unreasonable to argue that a smaller INTELSAT system could meet the purposes of the Preamble and competition that forces INTELSAT to
retrench neither causes INTELSAT "significant" economic harm nor
defeats the objects of the Agreement.
Given its current actions, however, the United States does not
appear able to assert a position that requires a retrenchment in the
concept of the INTELSAT system. Decisions on the size and operational capacity of the INTELSAT satellite system are made through
the clearly delineated processes of INTELSAT's management organs. The key planning organ, the Board of Governors,"!' is subject
to weighted voting by investment share and its largest member is
COMSAT.9 0 Under the 1962 Satellite Act and the Communications
Act of 1934,91 the United States has plenary power to instruct COMSAT with respect to INTELSAT system planning decisions.9 2 Thus,
the United States has had ample opportunity to raise questions
within INTELSAT as to whether the current or planned system unwisely goes beyond "the space segment required for international
public telecommunications services of high quality and reliability to
be available on a nondiscriminatory basis to all areas of the world." 9 3
Nevertheless, there is no record of system construction over
88 INTELSAT, INTELSAT:

l'E GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COOPERATIVE 5-7

(1987).
89 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 4, art. X, 23 U.S.T. at 3840.

o In 1988 COMSAT held a 26.42% interest in the INTELSAT organization. INTEL-

SAT, 1987-88 INTELSAT REPOR 44 (1988).
1)1Pub. L. No. 73-416, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1304, 1464 (1982); 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1982)).
92 See 47 U.S.C. § 721(c) (1982).
93 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 4, art. 111(a),
23 U.S.T. at 3819 (emphasis
added).
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U.S. objection. Having not made such a protest, the United States
has implicitly ratified decisions of the organization designing and expanding its offerings. Thus, the actual INTELSAT system as operated and planned by INTELSAT seems to be the only legally
acceptable foundation for analyzing the issue of technical harm or
significant economic harm.
Determining the extent and "significance" of harm, particularly
economic harm, to this system is a far more complex and fact-specific
predictive task. The objectives and purposes of INTELSAT as set
forth in the Agreement, however, provide helpful touchstones for
this process. First, and most important, if INTELSAT is to succeed
as a "commercial" enterprise, 94 it must generate sufficient total revenue to cover its fully allocated costs as specified in the INTELSAT
Operating Agreement. 9 5 Any government action that defeats such
recovery must be considered to cause "significant economic harm."
Second, if INTELSAT is to be a "global" system, 9 6 any government action that forecloses use within a member nation clearly produces "significant economic harm." Third, if INTELSAT is to
provide "expanded telecommunications services to all areas of the
world," 9 7 it cannot be required to meet its cost recovery objectives
by increasing rates to cover for revenues lost through diverted circuits without suffering "significant economic harm." Fourth, if INTELSAT is to maintain nondiscriminatory rates both in the legal and
practical sense, 98 it cannot be subjected to intense price competition
on high density routes (with concomitant readjustment of relative
cost recoveries) without sustaining "significant economic harm." 9 9
Fifth, if INTELSAT is to use radio frequency and orbital resources
with maximum efficiency' 0 0 it cannot be subjected to substantial traffic diversion and reduced fill without sustaining "significant economic harm."
The analysis of significant economic harm may eventually be
performed in a U.S. domestic legal forum, within the INTELSAT advisory procedure, or in an international forum reviewing U.S. com'4 See id., preamble, 23 U.S.T. at 3814 ("[The] aim of [the INTELSAT organization
is] achieving a single global commercial telecommunications satellite system.").
95 Operating Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite

Organization, opened for signature Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 4094, T.I.A.S. No. 7532.
96 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 4, preamble, 23 U.S.T. at 3814.
97 Id.
98 Id., art. V(d), 23 U.S.T. at 3823.

99 A similar situation in the United States arose when MCI Telecommunications Corporation, a newly authorized long distance carrier, was permitted to compete on "thick"
routes with American Telephone & Telegraph which averaged its rates throughout the
nation. Seegenera/y In re MCI Telecommunications Corp., 60 F.C.C.2d 25 (1976) (forbidding MCI to engage in such "cream-skimming"), rev'd sub norm. 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978).
loo INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 4, preamble, 23 U.S.T. at 3814.
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pliance with international treaty obligations. '0 ' Whatever the forum,
however, the analysis must take account of the amount of alternative
capacity being authorized or freed from pr'e-existing restrictions, the
imposition or continuation of any restrictions on use or pricing of
the alternative capacity that limit its impact on INTELSAT, and the
existence of any government policies that would shield INTELSAT
from such impacts before diversion became a severe problem. If the
totality of remaining controls fails to safeguard INTELSAT against a
serious risk of impairment of its objects and purposes through "significant economic harm," the United States is obligated to adjust one
or more of these parameters to increase INTELSAT's security as a
matter of both domestic and international law.
IV.

Available Safeguard Forums
An effort to prevent the United States from jeopardizing the objects and purposes of the INTELSAT Agreement or an attempt to
require the United States to restrict pre-existing satellite or cable authorizations in order to ameliorate recognized significant harm to
INTELSAT could be commenced in a number of forums. Using domestic law, including its incorporation of the INTELSAT Agreements, COMSAT (or a consumer of INTELSAT service) could
challenge an FCC licensing or rulemaking decision on competitive
flexibility and pursue that challenge through the U.S. courts as was
done in Teleport.10 2 In addition, COMSAT or a consumer could pursue an effort to condition pre-existing licenses or to modify existing
3
rules to enhance INTELSAT's security. 10
In any such challenge the court would make its own determination of the impact on INTELSAT objectives of the proposed action
or failure to restrain. While under traditional administrative law
principles a court would generally accord substantial weight to FCC
findings on the impact issue, 10 4 a more difficult situation would be
presented where the FCC determination was at odds with a "significant economic harm" finding by the INTELSAT Assembly of
Parties. 105
An even more intriguing opportunity for review could be
presented under Article XVIII(a) of the INTELSAT Agreement. 10 6
That article provides for mandatory arbitration of "all legal dis101 See infra notes 102-108 and accompanying text.
102 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402 (1982) (containing penalties, enforcement provisions

and procedures for challenging FCC orders).
103 Id.
104 See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,

842-45 (1984).
105 It is arguable that INTfELSAT's determination under its own Article XIV(d) standard should be accorded the deference due an administrative agency's interpretation of its
own enabling act.
10(i INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 4, art. XVIII(a), 23 U.S.T. at 3865.
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putes" between INTELSAT parties (or between INTELSAT and any
party) with respect to "rights and obligations" under the INTELSAT
Agreement.' 0 7 Elaborate procedures for the conduct of such arbitrations are established in Annex C of INTELSAT Agreement and
state that "It]he decision of the tribunal . . .shall be binding on all
disputants and shall be carried out by them in good faith."' 10 8
Given this facility, a government that believes that the United
States has violated its Article XIV(a) obligations by authorizing excessive competing capacity or overstimulating competitive behavior
could commence arbitration seeking to require the United States to
take steps to come into compliance with Article XIV(a) and/or to
compensate INTELSAT for its actual "significant economic harm."
The arbitral tribunal would have authority to construe the objects of
the Agreement and the impact of the challenged U.S. conduct.
Notwithstanding the right of the United States to make its own initial
determination on Article XIV(a) obligations, including those subject
to Article XIV(d) advisory procedure, the tribunal does not appear
constrained to defer to a party's good faith decision or even to accord it presumptive weight. Thus, the first significant evaluation of
Article XIV(a) and pacta sunt servanda obligations could arise from
binding international arbitration brought against the United States
by another INTELSAT party.
V.

Conclusion

The legal obligation of the United States to safeguard INTELSAT against competitive injury transcends merely abstract principles. In fact, the duty is enforceable under U.S. law, as the Teleport
decision reveals. In addition, violation of those obligations creates
serious risks for the United States in international arbitration pursuant to the INTELSAT Agreement.
The United States could eliminate this duty by withdrawal from
INTELSAT.'( 9 Short of that drastic action, however, the United
States cannot merely continue to assert domestic deregulatory policy
goals as providing an excuse for its actions. Rather, the decisionmakers must give meaningful weight to the legal safeguard obligations discussed in this Article and ensure that reliance on
marketplace forces remains consistent with these responsibilities.

107 Id.
108 Id., Annex C, art. 13(b), 23 U.S.T. at 3889.

101 Id., art. XVI, 23 U.S.T. at 3857.

